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USE OF WTO PANEL DECISIONS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNDER U.S. ANTIDUMPING 
LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly sixty years, the United States has participatcd in international 
trade agreements stemming from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT'').! From the beginning, GATT included a dispute resolution system to 
settle disagreements among party-states; however, the consent nature of the 
dispute resolution proceedings threatened the viability of the structure.2 The veto 
power, "the voluntary nature of membership in GATT, [and] a nation's ability to 
block the operation of the GATT dispute settlement procedure" rendered the 
regime vulnerable to unilateral destabilization.' In the Uruguay Round of 1994, 
GATT countries gathered and, among other things, formed the World Trade 
Organization ("WTO"). The WTO has, in turn, spawned a jurisprudence of its 
own in the form of panel and appellate decisions. 
This body of international jurisprudence sometimes conflicts with the 
actions of U.S. administrative agencies responsible for the regulation of intema-
tional trade. U.S. courts confront this conflict between WTO panel decisions and 
U.S. administrative agency actions with two competing doctrines: (I) the 
I General Agreel11ent on TarifTs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947.61 Stat. A-II. T.I.A.S. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT], For a concise history of dispute resolution under the old GATT and WTO systel11s, see 
Susan H. Shin, Comparisoll oj the f)ispil/c '<;('II/cl11(,111 Proccdures oj fhe tf'or/d Trade Org,ani::.atioll ji),. Tracie 
Dispules (/Ild Ihe 1II/('I'-AII/('ri('(/II.';\,,I/olI /orlluHIlIIl Righl,l lio!"liol!,I. 16 N.Y. IN!'! L. Rc\·. 43, 47 (2003). 
2 Shin, sl/I'm note I. 
3 Jd. at 4R. 
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Chel'ron doctrine,4 which dictates that a court will gIve great deference to an 
administrative agency's interpretation of ambiguous congressional legislation, 
complemented by a general judicial deference to executive actions 111 foreign 
affairs, and (2) the Charming Bet.,y doctrine,) which encourages courts to 
interpret legislation, including treaties, so as not to violate international law. In 
the context of this comment, both of these doctrines are seen as interpretive 
canons. 
Interpretive canons are tools that courts use to decide between different 
possible interpretations of an ambiguous statute or treaty. Courts apply the law, 
and sometimes Congress leaves a statute open to various possible interpretations. 
Congress may do so either because it wishes to avoid the political costs of clearly 
speaking on an issue or because the subject matter of the legislation is extremely 
complex and the executive branch() has a unique institutional compctcnce in a 
particular area. In international trade law, congressional action (in the form of 
treaties and statutes) is often lacking in detail rcgarding the implemcntation of 
U.S. trade policies. This can lead to a connict between a WTO panel decision 
about obligations under an international agrecment and a U.S. administrative 
agency's assessment of those same obligations. 
4 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Rcsources Dcr Council. Inc., 4(,7 U.S. X37, X42 X43 (19~4). See 
discussiol! ill/m Part IV.B.I. 
S Murray v. Schooner Channing Betsy, (, U.S. 64, II K (I K(4). SI!I! discussion ill/ra Part IV.B.2. 
(, For the purposes of this comment, the executive branch of the U.S. govcrnmcnt includes all of the 
administrative agencies responsible for the enforcemcnt and implementation of congrcssionallcgislation. Thus, 
the terms "cxccutivc," the "Coml11ercc Dcpartmcnt" (or simply "Commcrcc"), and thc "Intcrnational Trade 
Administration" ("Trade Administration") all posse" essentially the same relationship to the judiciary and 
Congrcss. 
238 
• 
Issue The WTO and u.s. Antidumping Law 
This commcnt will: (I) cxplain thc leading u.s. federal court precedent 
in addressing the conflict between WTO panel decisions and executive action in 
antidumping regulation; (2) briefly summarize the reasoning behind the 
precedent and the counter arguments to that reasoning; and (3) propose a 
consistent approach to the application of WTO panel decisions in litigation 
involving interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and its implementing 
legislation. Specifically, I propose that WTO panel decisions be given more 
weight than they arc now; panel decisions should set up a presumption of the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of executive interpretation of Congressional 
legislation. This presumption could be rebutted by evidence of a pressing need 
for a court to defer to the executive under traditional political deference 
doctrines. 
This comment IS limited to the narrow context of administrative 
implementation of antidumping law in the United States and the tension that 
results when that implementation ditTers from a WTO panel decision. 
Antidumping law is particularly useful as an avenue of analysis because it both 
circumscribes the extent of analysis and provides an insight deep into the 
doctrinal heart of the issues. I do not attempt in this paper to tackle the entire 
issue of the applicability of international law in U.S. courts, nor even the more 
limited issue ofapplication ofWTO panel decisions generally in domestic courts. 
Also, I will not attempt here to explain or examine the general issue of judicial 
deference to the executive in foreign affairs. Rather, I use the recent decision in 
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Corus v. United States7 and other recent federal court decisions regarding 
antidumping to gain a useful vantage on this developing tension in international 
law. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND, ANTIDUMPING LAW, AND TilE WTO AGREEMENT 
A. Explanation o/"tile Internatiol7al Anti-DulIlping Agreement and 
Its Implementing Legislation in the United States 
"Dumping" has been variously defined. x Generally, "[dJumping is a 
species of price discrimination. "9 Speci fically, it is "the practice of charging a 
lower price in the export market than in the home market for similar 
merchandise, taking account of any differenees in the conditions of sale and the 
characteristics of the merchandise."lo 
u.s. federal law adopts this definition. According to U.S. federal 
antidumping legislation, dumping occurs when "a class or kind of foreign 
merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its 
fair value, and ... an industry in the United States is materially injured, or is 
threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United 
States IS materially retarded."11 According to the U.S. statutory regime, the 
7 Corus Eng'g Steels Ltd. v. United States, No. OJ-IIO (Cl. InC! Trade Aug. 27, 2(03). See 
discussion il/!i-a Part II.C. 
8 Michael S. Knoll, Ulliled Sill II's .llIlii/L1l1/pilig LillI" Till' (·lIsejiJ,. Rl!collsidl'ralioJ/, 22 TeX. IN ,'/ 
L. J. 265, 266 (I 9X7); Id a/ n.2 (pointing out that among othcr dclinitions, dumping has becn dctined as: "1. 
Sale at prices belov. foreign market pricesl; I 2. Sale at prices v.ith which I I()reignl competitors cannot copel; I 
3. Sale at prices abroad which arc lower than currcnt home priccsl; and I 4. Sale at priccs unrcmuncrative to the 
scllcrs"). 
9 1<1. at 266. 
10 !d. at 267. 
II 19 U .S.c. ~ 1673 ( 19(4). The statu Ie cmpowers the Departmcnt ofCommcrcc to"l imposc I upon 
such merchandise all antidumping duty, in addition to any other duly ill1po:-.cd, ill an amollnt equal to the amollnt 
by which the normal \ aluc exceeds the export price (or the constructed cxport price) 1(11' the mcrehandise." It!. 
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"administering authority" shall determine "antidumping duties" by comparing 
the "normal value and export price (or constructed export price) of each entry of 
the subject merchandise" and calculate "the dumping margin for each such 
entry." 12 
The U.S. "administering authority" for the regulation of antidumping 
violations is the International Trade Administration ("Trade Administration"), a 
division of the Department of Commerce ("Commerce"). The Trade 
Administration regulates antidumping by investigating alleged violations of 
antidumping law and assessing antidumping duties. 13 Decisions by the Trade 
Administration can be appealed to the Court of Intemational Trade. 14 However, 
the findings of the Trade Administration are given substantial deference. I) 
The Trade Administration was established as an independent agency 
within the Depaliment of Commerce in order to "insulate the Government's 
decision to impose antidumping duties from narrowly political concerns."J() U.S. 
antidumping law is largely a direct implementation of U.S. international obliga-
tions under Article VI of GATT. 17 The Uruguay Round of 1994 attempted to 
harmonize antidumping regulation among the GATT countries. The U.S. trade 
negotiators exited the Uruguay Round with the high hope that "all countries 
which become members of the [WTOl will be subject to the same antidumping 
12 19 U.s.C.A. ~ 1675(a)(2)(A) (1994). 
13 For a very Ihorough di,cussion of this process. sec The L'mgllal" ROlllld Agre('l1/ellts Act 
Statell/ellt of Adlilillistruti"e Actioll .. Igreelilellt (III .1l1tidllllljJillg (Sept. 27, 1994), 1994 WL 761788 [hereinafkr 
Antidumping Statemcnt!. Seea!so 19U.s.C.A. ~ 1671 (1994). 
14 19 U.S.c. ~ 1516(c) (1994) 
15 21 A AM. JllR. 21l CustOIl/S alld Dlltil!s IlIIl'or' Reglliatiolls ~ 2X I (2004). 
16 Fcd. Mogul Corp. v. Unitcd Stales. (,3 F,3d 1572. 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
17 (lATT. sllpra note I. 
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ruleS."IX In the U.S. publication of its understanding, it "recognize[d] the need 
for a common understanding of the obligations of Members" of GATT.19 
Inevitably, not all countries agree about the proper enforcement of antidumping 
rules. 
B. wro Panel Decisiol1s 
Article 23 of the GATT agreement set up a mutual obligation among 
parties of the WTO to submit disputes to the WTO dispute resolution system and 
accept resolutions achieved within that system.20 The Uruguay Round of 1994 set 
up a dispute resolution system superior to the old dispute resolution system under 
GATT. 2 I Among the improvements were fixed timetables, increased 
independence of the tribunal, and speedier and more predictable proeedures. 22 
The new dispute resolution system, consisting of the Dispute Settlement Body 
I g Antidumping Statcmcnt, slIl'ra notc 13 ("Unlike thc 1979 Tokyo Round Antidumping Code (the 
1979 Code), all countries which become mcmbcrs of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will bc subject to 
thc same antidumping rules."). 
19 Ullderslwulillg Oil Ih" /lIlerf!r"I(/I;OIl of.lrli"/,, XXII' of Ih" (j(,II(!I'a/ .·lgr""II/i'1I1 Oil Tilri//.' (/ild 
];-ad(' /<)<)4. Final Act Embodying the Results ofthc Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations General 
Agreement on TaritTs and Tradc, April 15,200-1,33 I.L.M. 125 (1994),1994 WL 761-1S3. 
20 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing thc World Trade Organization, Anncx 2, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1241 (1994). 
GATT. Annex 2, Article 23(2) states: 
Id 
In such cases, Mcmbers shall: 
(a) not make a determination to the ctkclthat a violation has occurred, that benctiis have 
been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered 
agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in 
accordance with the rules and proccdurcs of this Undcrstanding, and shallmakc any such 
determination consistent with the tindings contained in the panel or Appellate Body 
report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding. 
21 Shin. slIf!ra note I at 4~ 49. 
22 World Trade Organization, Ullder.'fol/(lillg Ih" liTO: Selllillg IJiSf!lIlcs, a/ 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/displc.htmlfappcals (last visited Mar. 26, 20(5) ("A 
procedure for settling disputes existed under the old GATT. but it had no lixed timetables, rulings were easier 
to block. and many cases dragged on for a long time inconclusively. The Uruguay Round agreemcnt introduced 
a more structured process with more clearly detined stages in the procedure."). 
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("DSB" or "panel") and the Appellate Body,21 have fixed procedural rules and 
deadlines and a clear appeals process that ensures finality.24 
Dispute resolution in the WTO system has three steps: (1) consuHation, 
(2) panel decision, and (3) the appeals process. 25 When parties first disagree, they 
submit their dispute to the WTO, and the organization facilitates a period of 
consultation. During consultation, the state parties attempt to resolve their 
conflict. Failing that, the parties submit their dispute to a panel. The panel hears 
the parties' case and renders a decision on the dispute. The "first rulings" made 
by the panel can then be endorsed or rejected by the WTO's full membership.2b 
More often, the Appellate Body reviews the decisions made by the panel. "The 
Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions 
of a panel, and Appellate Body Reports, once adopted by the Dispute Settlement 
Body, must be accepted by the parties to the dispute."n 
23 World Trade Organi7ation, nil"!,lIle Sell/ell/(,III: .I/,/wl/ole Bod,', III http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop e. dispu e/appellate body e.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 20()5). 
Id 
Id. 
The Appellate Body was established in 1995 under Article 17 of the Understanding on 
Rules and Proccdurcs (joverning the Settlement of Disputcs. It is a standing body of 
seven persons that hears appeals hom reports issued by panels in disputes brought by 
WTO Membcrs .... Thc Appcllate Hody has its scat in Gcneva, Switzcrland. 
24 World Trade Organization, Lilldenlolll/ill,!; Ihe 11 TO, I'llI'm note n. 
Dispute settlcmcnt is thc central pillar ofthc multilateral trading systcm. and the WTO's 
unique contribution to the stability of the glohal economy. Without a means of scttling 
disputcs. the rules-based system would hc less effective because the rules could not he 
en(l)rced. The WTO's procedure underscores the rule of law, and it makes the trading 
system more secure and predictable. The system is based on clearly-detined rules, with 
timetables j(,r completing a case. 
25 Shin, I'llI'm note I at 49-51. 
26 World Trade Organization, .I'llI'm note 22. The dccision is madc by a conscnsus ofthc WTO\ full 
membcrship. Obviously, this rarely takes place. 
n Iii. 
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C. Corus v. U.S. ~ Tension Between U.S Domestic LaI\' and /lItel"l1atiollal Law 
Conls v. U.s., deeided in the U.S. Court of International Trade in August 
of 2003, concerned a conflict between an executive interpretation of legislation 
implementing the Anti-Dumping Agreement and a contrary interpretation of 
obligations under the agreement by a WTO panel.2x Corus Group PLC,29 
formerly, British Steel, owns the largest steel producing companies in the United 
Kingdom. Corus Engineering Steels Ltd. ("Corus"), a subsidiary of Corus Group 
PLC, manufactures steel and imports large amounts of steel into the U.S.l11 
Several steel manufacturers in the U.S. complained to the U.S. 
Commerce Department that Corus11 was allegedly dumping its steel products into 
the U.S. markeP2 Commerce decided that Corus was, in fact, illegally dumping 
steel products in the U.S. market and assessed a duty equal to the level of 
dumping.]] Corus appealed the finding and argued that it sold the stccl products, 
on average, at or above the U.S. market priee. 14 Corus argued that Commerce's 
2g No. 03-110, slip op. at I (Ct. Int'I Trade Aug. 27, 20(3). 
29 According to the eorus website: 
Corus I is I an internalionalmelal company. providing steel and aluminum produds and 
services to customers worldwide. With an annual turnover of £X billion and major 
operating facilities in thc Netherlands, Ciermany, France, Norway and Belgium, COrtlS 
employs 4X,500 people in over 40 countries .... COrtlS shares are listed on the London, 
New York and Amsterdam stock exchanges. eorus was crcated in October 1999 Ihrough 
the merger of Brilish Sleel and Koninklijke Hoogovens. 
hltp:J!www.corusgroup.com!ellicompan}..aboul corusl (last \' isited iv'lar. 26, 2(05). 
30 /d. 
31 According to 19 U.S.c. ~~ 1673(1), 1677(35), Ihe Commerce Department is required to 
determine whelhcr imporled merchandisc is being or is likely to be sold in the United States at less than its fair 
value, i.e. the amount by which the price charged Ill!' subjecl merchandise in the home or other comparative 
market ("the normal ",due." or "NV") exceeds thc priec charged for subjeci merchandise in Ihe United Siaies 
I"the U.S. price"). 
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methodology of "zeroing" the imported product was contrary to the obligations 
of the U.S. under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.15 If not for the 
"zeroing" methodology used by Commerce, Corus would not have been found in 
violation of antidumping regulations and would not have been charged a duty)6 
That is, if not for the zeroing methodology employed by Commerce, the margin 
of dumping would have been de millil11l1s or zeroY 
The Commerce Department calculates dumping duties by finding the 
ditTerenee between the U.S. price of the impOlied product and the normal price 
of the produePx In its calculation, Commerce ignores all negative values (that is, 
imports that are sold above the normal value) and only focuses on those imports 
that are being sold below the normal value. w This "zeroing" of the non-dumping 
values skews the calculation and makes it much easier to find a dumping 
violation. 
/d. 
35 Id. S"" also Antidumping Statcment, sl/l'ra notc 13. Article 2.4.2, provides that 
in investigations (not rcvicws), national authoritics normally will estahlish dumping margins by 
comparing cither: 
• a weightcd-avcrage of normal values to a wcightcd-average of cxport priccs of comparable 
mcrehandisc: or 
• nOl"mal valuc and export price on a transaetion-to-transaetion basis. Where such comparisons 
arc inappropriate, howevcr, thc Unitcd States' current methodology is authorizcd. Authorities may 
compare a weighted-averagc normal value to individual export transactions. providcd that there is a 
pattern of priccs that diners signilicantly and that they explain why a weighted-averagc-to-
weighted-avcrage or transaetion-to-transaction comparison is not appropriate. 
311 Coms. No. 03-11 n, slip 01'. al 7. 
37 1d. 
3R Slater Sleeis Corp. v. United Slates, No. 03-162 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dce. 16, 200}). 
39 For cxamplc, ifthc "normal price" (i.e. the fair market value of the good) ofa product was $2.0() 
and the imported price of the good was $1.75, an antidumping duty of $.25 per good would bc asscssed. 
Suppose thcrc werc a bundlc of related or identical goods, with all of thcir "normal prices" at S2.00, half of 
which arc sold in Ihe U.S. Itlr S2.25 and half of which arc sold lilr $1.75. Under the melhodology appn)\'cd of 
by thc WTO, the net antidumping duty should bc $0.00 (($2.00 - $2.25) I ($2.00 - $1.75)). Under the U.S. 
zeroing methodology, hO\vcver, the imported goods sold at $2.25 would be ignored. Consequently, the ncgativc 
result ($2.00 - S2.25 ~ -$.25) would not bc used 10 onsct the positivc result ($2.00 - $1.75 = $.25). Thus, the 
antidumping duty for the hundle of goods would remain $.25 for every good sold at $1.75. 
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Previously, the Court of Intemational Trade had approved of the 
Commerce Department's zeroing methodology as a permissible interpretation of 
antidumping law. 40 In Serampore Industries, the court acknowledged the 
"substantial deference" it gives to "[ Commerce] in both its interpretation of its 
statutory mandate and the methods it employs in administering the antidumping 
law."4l The court decided that Commerce's interpretation was reasonable because 
it "interpreted the statute in such a way as to prevent a foreign producer from 
masking its dumping with more profitable sales."42 In Bowe Passa/, the court 
acknowledged that the "methodology introduces a statistical bias in the 
calculation of dumping margins," but that it was still a reasonable interpretation 
of antidumping law because the "statute is silent on the question of zeroing 
negative margins" and the methodology was "necessary to combat masked 
dumping."4) 
Corus, nevertheless, argued that the "zeroing" methodology was illegal 
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement:!4 In making this argument Corus relied on 
a decision by a panel and an appellate decision in the EC Bed Linen case.45 
40 Seral11porc Indus. Pvt. Ltd. v. U.S. Dq1t of (·oml11erce. 675 F.Supp. 1354, 1361 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
19K7). 
41 /d. Masked dUl11ping is a species of dumping wherein a cOl11pany sells some products above 
market price in order to "mask"' the dumping of products sold bclow cost. In ScriliJ/f!ore, the court simply 
accepted Commerce's masked dumping rationale I(lf using a leroing methodology; the court did not scrutinize 
the necessity or reasonableness of the methodology. III. 
421£1. 
43 Bowe Passal Reinigungs-Und Waschereilechnik GMBH v. United States, 926 F.Supp. II3X. 1150 
(Ct. Int'I Trade 1996). 
44 Corus Eng'g Steels Ltd. v. United States, No. 03-110, slip op. at I (Ct. Int'! Trade Aug. 27, 20(3). 
45 Report of the Appellate Body. European Communities -- Antidumping Duties on Imports of 
Cotton-Type Bcd Linen li'lll11 India, VvTd)SI41:AB.R (Mar. I. 20(l!). <"aiJable at 2001 WTO LLXIS 13 
I hcrcina Iter Fe Bed LiJ/eJ/ \. 
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Notably, 111 EC Bed Linen, the WTO panel deeided that the European 
Community's use of a similar "zeroing" methodology violated the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. 4(, 
The Corlls Court declined to apply the WTO panel decision and held 
that, despite the WTO panel's decision, Commerce's use of zeroing was 
reasonablc,47 and that Commerce was not bound by a WTO panel decision in 
applying Congress's implementing legislation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 4x 
The court decided against Corus and allowed the antidumping duties to stand. 
On February 19, 2004, the European Communities requested that the 
WTO establish a panel to review the Corl/S Coul1's deeision.49 The European 
Community has sent two such requests to the WTO requesting a panel. The U.S. 
has blocked both of those requests. However, according to the WTO rules, the 
third request cannot be blocked by the U.S. Thus, a Panel is nearly certain to be 
convened on this issue in the near future. It seems likely that Coms was a test 
ease to get the "zeroing" issue before a WTO Panel. This is evident from the lack 
of a U.S. federal appeal by eorus. Rather, the European Community is 
"appealing" the court's decision with a request to the WTO. 
The Corlls Court was not the first court to address and disregard the EC 
Bed Linen decision in interpreting antidumping law. The previous year, in 
Timken, the court held that it was not dispositive that the zeroing methodology 
46 1d. 
47 COrl/S, No. 03-110, slip op. at 7. 
48 1d. 
49 Request for the Establishmcnt of a Pancl by thc Europcan Comlllunities. Uniled SillieS -- Lilli'S, 
R<:glllllli(l/ls ,",,1 Melilodologl' jh,. ('lIlel/llIling f)1/1Il1!ing ."I"'gins ("/.emil/g "), WT/DS 294/7·Rcv, I (I'eb, 19, 
2(04), 
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employed by Commerce was contrary to the WTO decision in the EC Bed Linen 
case, because WTO Panel decisions are "non-binding" on the eourPO The court 
reasoned that "the ministerial body of the WTO is the only body that can 
interpret" a decision by a panel or the appellate body.51 Therefore, the court 
reasoned, a WTO panel interpretation of U.S. obligation under the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement had no weight in eourt.52 
Such dismissals of WTO panel decisions are now the norm in 
antidumping regulation. This slighting of panel decisions has led to increasing 
tension between the actions of the executive branch (the Commerce Department 
in particular) and international understanding of U.S. obligations under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, as evidenced by the WTO dispute resolution system. 
III. WilY DON'T U.S. COURTS ApPLY TIlE DECISIONS OF TilE WTO PANEL IN 
ANTIDUMPING CASES AGAINST TilE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT? 
There are several reasons that U.S. courts do not apply WTO Panel 
decisions directly. The most obvious reason is that the implementing legislation 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement expressly forbids its] The next most obvious 
50 "This Court does not automatically assume thallhe WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions are 
correct interpretations of United Stales obligations pursuanl to Ihe GATT. Ralher, Ihey arc non-binding 
decisions."' Timken Co. v. United Stales, ~4() F. Sllpp. ~d I22X, 1~39 (el. Inl'l Trade 2(02). 
51 /d. at 1239n.15. 
52 Id. at 1244 ("'Therefore, the Appellate Body's decision in I'('-Bed Linen does not compel a 
change to this Court's holding in Bolt,,, Pussu! ... that the Department's zeroing pradice is upheld 'until it 
becomes clear that such practice is impermissible.""). 
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(I) [N]o person other than (he Uniled States --
(A) shall have a cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round 
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appro\'al of such an agreement, or 
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reason IS that the EC Bcd Lincn case was decided between the European 
Community and India; the U.S. was not party to the dispute and WTO decisions 
do not have a rcsjlldica/a efTect on states not party to a particular dispute. 54 
There are, however, more general doctrinal reasons for this judicial 
reticence. In general, judicial deference to the executive branch in this area stems 
from two principal doctrines of American jurisprudence that have traditionally 
supported the United States' dualist approach to intemational law. First, coulis 
havc historically deferrcd to the executive in foreign afTairs because the executive 
was seen as the political branch best suited to make determinations regarding 
foreign relations and international law. There arc at least three principal reasons 
for this general foreign affairs deference: 55 (I) the executive branch acts as the 
"sole organ" of the United States in foreign afTairs;56 (2) foreign afTairs questions 
inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States ... on 
the ground that ~lIch action or inaction is inconsistent \vith such an agreement. 
Id. Howc\u, this docs not mean the WTO panel decisions arc not important in antidumping disputes in general. 
19 U.S.c. ~ 3512(c) clearly docs not allow an independent action based on the Uruguay Rounds agreement. but 
it docs not preclude argulllents about the interpretation of the agreements in ordinary antidulllping duty protest 
actions. like the underlying cause in ("oms hased on Rule 56.2 of the Court of International Trade. Coms, No. 
03-110, slip op. at I See also Roger P. A\t(lI"ll, Federal COllrts. Illternatiollal rrihllilais. al/(I the COli till 1111111 oj 
Deter(,IICI!, 43 VA. 1. IN "I. L. 675, 735 n.20R (2003). 
54 Slater Steels Corp. v. United States, No. 03-162, slip op. at 6 (el. Int'l Trade Dec. 16,20(3). 
55 Curtis Bradley suggested four types of t(lI"eign athlirs defcrence: (I) Political Qucstion 
Deference: (2) ExeclItivc Branch Lawmaking Deference: (3) International Facts Deferencc: (4) Persuasiveness 
Deferencc: and (5) Chevron Deference. Curtis A. Bradley, (,hel'I"OI1 LJeji'rellcc alld Foreigll .1t/airs, 86 VA. L. 
Rrv. 649, 659663 (2000). Jonathan Charney idcntitied eight reasons I(Jrjudicial deference in foreign rclations: 
(I) International law may not be "Iaw" in domestic setting: (2) the need for an independent judiciary: (3) the 
exccutiyc's expertise in internationalla\\': (4) ex<:cutive access to bcts particular to /(lreign altairs: (5) the alien 
quality of international law: (C» uncertainty of clfeets in foreign affairs decisions: (7) the need for a sole voice 
in /()l'eign athlirs: and (X) the need for cxecutiye flexibility in t(lreign afbirs. Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial 
/Jeti:r,,"('e ill Foreigil Re/aliol1l, XJ A~1. J. I" r'1 L. H05, XOX R 12 (I 'IX'!). This author has condensed the list to 
three, incorporating ,til of the relevant bctors to the judicial deference at issue: conllict between WTO panel 
decisions and executive regulations in antidumping. 
56 See discussion illtm Part III.A.I. 
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tend to be policy-based and political rather than legal;'i7 and (3) executive 
expertise and specialized knowledge are better suited to foreign a t1'a irs 
questions.'iX 
The second reason for judicial reluctance to use WTO panel decisions to 
invalidate executive branch interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agrcement is the 
Chevroll doctrine. 50 According to this doctrine, courts, in celiain circumstances, 
give the administrative agencies (like the Commerce Department) broad 
discretion in inteqJreting and implementing ambiguous legislation, including 
treaties. This broad discretion granted by courts sometimes comes into opposition 
with an interpretative canon, the Charming BeL~y, which encourages coulis to 
avoid an interpretation of an ambiguous statute that would violate international 
law. The potential conflict arises when an agency interprets a statute contrary to 
the decision of an international tribunal, like the WTO panel. This has led to 
increasing tensions between international law and domestic law; Coms is the 
latest example of this tension in the context of antidumping law. 
Various approaches have been recommended to alleviate this apparent 
incongruity of international and domestic law. On one extreme, some commen-
tators advocate a "rule of law" approach that would give judges complcte 
discretion to decide "what the law is," and then apply the decisions of interna-
tiona I tribunals so as to harmonize domestic law with international obligations.60 
250 
57 See discu"ion illti"" Part III.A.2. 
Sg See discussion ill/m Part III.AJ. 
5<) Set' Jiocussion illtm Part 111.13. 
60 See disclission illti·" Part 1 VA. 
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On the other extreme, some recommend a judicial "hands-off' approach to 
foreign affairs: encouraging courts to avoid any attempt to contradict the 
executive branch in foreign affairs. 61 This appears to be close to the approach 
taken by courts recently in antidumping law decisions.(,2 The Court of 
International Trade, for example, mentions the EC Bed Lillell case and then 
proceeds to completely disregard it in favor of an executive interpretation of 
antidumping law.h) 
This author recommends an approach(,4 between the two extremes: 
executive implementation of ambiguous treaties should be granted substantial 
deference, but decisions by an international tribunal should be significant 
evidence of the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation. Under the 
recommended approach, a WTO panel decision, such as EC Bed Linell, would 
not control a court's decision; rather, it would set up a presumption of unreason-
ableness against a contrary executive interpretation of antidumping law. Such a 
presumption could be rebutted, but it would require more than mere assertion of 
a policy concern ~ it would require proof of an overriding executive interest in 
acting contrary to a WTO panel decision. 
61 S~I! discussion ill/i-II Part IVB. 
62 Slatcr Stcels Corp. v. United States. No. 03-1 (,2. slip op. at 5 6 (Ct. Int'I Tradc Dcc. 16,20(3): 
('orus Eng'g Steels Ltd. v. United States. No. 03-110. slip op. at 7 (Ct. Int'I Trade Aug. 27. 20(3): Timken Co. 
\. United States. 240 F. Supp. 2d 122X. 1239 (Ct. Int'l Tradc 20(2). 
63 Iri. In ."/a/er. the Court summarily dismissed thc /,'C B~rI LiIlOI case as inapplicable to thc United 
States. No. 03-1 (12. slip op, at 6. The court was correct in noting that \VTO Pancl dccisions lack shirl! d('cisis 
ctlcct and the United States vvas not a party (and thus, not hound). However, the S/II/cr court, along with the 
courts in ('OrtiS and TimkclI. hliled to discuss thc merits and reasoning of the F:C Bed Lillen case. 
64 See discussion ill/i'l/ Part IV.C. 
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A. Political Question Deference 
Generally, the judiciary grants significant deference to the executive in 
foreign affairs because the executive branch, as opposed to the judicial branch, is 
uniquely suited to act in the realm offoreign affairs. This division oflabor among 
the branches of government may loosely be termed a version of the political 
question doctrine.!» When confronted with a political qucstion, a court will 
generally avoid contradicting the political branch of government. The political 
question doctrine is not an absolute bar to judicial action. Rather, courts will 
balance the potential effects of judicial action with the reasons why the executive 
branch alone is competent to act. 66 Three arguments favor the executive branch's 
competence to act alone: ( I ) the executive is the "sole organ" or sole voice of the 
United States; (2) foreign affairs questions tend to be policy-based and political 
rather than legal; and (3) executive expertise and specialized knowledge are 
better suited to foreign affairs questions. 
Before assessing these arguments, it IS useful to note that there is a 
distinction between non-justiciable political questions and those political 
questions that are justiciable, but the judiciary defers to the judgment of the 
executive branch. One authority notes: 
65 "Political-question doctrine: The judicial principle that a court should refuse to decide an issue 
involving the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or legislative branch of government.·· BL'VlJ-;'S 
LAW DllliUNARV 1179 (7th cd. 1999). Set! a/so 16 l'.J.S. COI/.\lillllioll(f/ Lilt" ~ 176 (2004) ("Except to the extent 
that such power is conferred on the courts by constitutional or statutory provisions. it is not within the province 
of the judiciary to detcrmine political questions."). 
66 [lIt is error to suppose thai every case or controversy which touches foreign relations 
lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seelll invariably to show a 
discriminating analysis of the pal1icular question posed. in terms of the history of its 
management by the political branches. "fits susceptibility to judicial handling in the light 
of its nature and posture in the specific case. and oflhe possible consequences ofiudicial 
action. 
Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. I g6. 211 212 (1962). 
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[The political question] label docs not necessarily mean that the issue is 
considered nonjusticiablc. Instead, in many political question cases, 
courts are simply holding that the President's decision was within his 
authority and thercft)re law for the courts. (,7 
1. The Executive acts as the "sole o rga 11 " or sole voice oflhe United States ill 
fhreigll afrairs 
Proponents of this justification would point to the solidarity required in 
international negotiations in general and in trade negotiations in particular. The 
seminal case presenting this position is Curtiss-Wright.6x In Curtiss-Wright, the 
court recognized that 
if, 111 the maintenance of our international relations, 
embarrassment-perhaps serioLis embarrassment-is to be 
avo'ided and sLiccess for our aims achieved, congressional 
legislation which is to be made ctTective through negotiation and 
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the 
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory 
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs 
alone involvedYi 
Since then, courts have been reluctant to disturb the actions of the 
executive in the international arcna. 70 This judicial reticence includes questions 
Id. 
67 Bradley. slIl,m note 55 at 660. Bradley continues: 
For example. the Suprellle Court has labeled as "political" the issue of whether. after a 
change of conditions, a foreign nation continues to remain a parly to a treaty, hut the 
Court has not treated the i"ue as Iloll-justiciable: rather. it has accepted as legally binding 
the executive branch's determination of the issue. Nevertheless. there arc instances of 
non-justiciable political questions in the foreign atlllirs area. especially in the lower 
courts. Indeed. although this "pure" version of the political question doctrine has waned 
substantially in recent years as a general matter. it still appears to have sOllle t']fee in the 
t(Jfcign athlirs area. 
6R United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp .. 299 US. 304 (1936). 
69 Id. at 320. 
70 ",Tlhe courts traditionally refrain li'om disturbing 'the very delicate. plenary and exclusive power 
of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the tieltl of tClreign relations.· .. Footwear Distrib. 
& Retailers of Am. v. United States. R52 F Supp. l07g. IOl)6 (Ct. Inri Trade 1994) (quoting Curtiss-Wright. 
299 U.S at 320). 
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of international trade.?! In Federal Mogul, the court recognized that "[t]rade 
policy is an increasingly important aspect of foreign policy, an area in which the 
executive branch is traditionally accorded considerable deference."n The court 
stressed the political f1exibility required for an administrative agency to interpret 
and implement foreign trade law.?' However, the court seemed to contradict itself 
by stating that "[a]ntidumping dutics arc not simply tools to be deployed or 
withheld in the conduct of domcstic or forcign policy."74 In the end, the court 
concluded that despite the neutral purpose of antidumping duties, "[tlor the Court 
of International Trade to read a GATT violation into the statute, over Commerce's 
objection, may commingle powers bcst kept separate."7) In other words, the court 
followed the traditional "sole-voice" approach and declined to pass judgment on 
the actions of an administrativc agcncy engaged in international rclations. 
The executive branch, however, including its constitutive administrative 
agencies, is not thc "sole organ" of intcrnational trade regulation. Generally, there 
arc the obvious examples of commingling of foreign affairs power, such as the 
Senate's participation in the Executive's treaty making power76 and Congress' 
constitutional prerogative to regulate international commerce, dcclare war on 
foreign states, and define violations of the law of nations. 77 In particular, 
71 S"" Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 15XI (Fed Cir. 1'1'15). 
72 Iii. 
13M 
74 id. 
75 1<1. at ISll2. 
76 "IThe Executivel shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. to make 
Treaties. provided t\\O thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONS!. art. II, ~ 2, ,I. 2. 
77 Congress has constitutional authority to regulate commerce, dctine offenses against the law of 
nations, and declare war. U.S. Co", I. art. I, ~ X, el. 2. 10, II. 
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Congress is granted constitutional authority over the imposition of duties and 
tari ffs. 7X Pursuant to this power, Congress has instructed the Trade Administration 
to consult with the appropriate congressional committee when deciding whether 
to alter existing procedures or policies in reaction to an adverse WTO panel 
report. 7') 
The "sole organ" consideration ignores strong policies supported by the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement; therefore, it does not justify judicial ignorance of the 
GATT Antidumping and Subsidy Codesxo and the opinions of the intemational 
tribunals instituted to adjudicate disputes about obligations under GATT. Indeed, 
GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement are intemational attempts to establish a 
fair playing field xl with clcar guidelines, an attempt that Congress endorsed by 
signing the GATT Agreement. x2 Clear congressional endorsement of an intema-
tional body would belie the notion that the executive branch is the only political 
branch of the govemment whose will is represented by U.S. participation in 
intemational trade. 
n No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Dulies on 
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's 
inspcction Laws: and the nct Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on 
Imports or Fxports, shall be for Ihe Usc of the Treasury of the United States: and all such 
Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Conlrol of the Congress. 
U.S C()to;SI. arl. I. ~ 10. cl. 2. 
79 19 lJ.S.c. ~ 3533. entitled "Dispute Settlement Panels and Procedures." instructs that \I hen "" 
dispute settlement panet or the Appellate Body tlnels in its report that a regulation or practice of a dep'lrtment 
or agency of the United States is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements," the Trade 
Representative must consult with ··the appropriate congressional committees" and "private sector advisory 
committees" before amending any policies or procedures. ~ 3533(g). 
XO Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, (,52 F. Supp. 153X, 1543 «'I. Int'l Trade 1987). 
XI See Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, (,3 F.3d 1572, 15XO (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Antidumping 
jurisprudence seeks to be !ilir. rather than to build bias into the calculation of dumping margins."). 
82 See gelleraiir Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-4(,5, lOR Stat. 4R09 (1994). 
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2. Foreign a/fc/irs questions tend to he po/icy-hased and political rather thall 
legal 
Courts are also reluctant to question a politically accountable branch of 
government regarding matters of policy. While it is admitted that the judiciary is 
the final voice when it comes to legal questions, policy questions are best left to 
the executive and legislative branches as those branehcs which are closer to the 
people. This policy argument seems especially pronounced regarding WTO 
decisions. 
Antidumping and taritTs generally are politically sensitive and policy-
intense areas of decision-making. Proponents of this view would cite the 
domestic responses to the WTO panel's decision, in November, 2003, that U.S. 
steel tariffs were illegal, clearing the way for the European Union to impose $2 
billion of sanctions unless the U.S. abandons the duties. X} The Bush adminis-
tration and some members of Congress discredited the panel's decision and 
contemplated ignoring it altogether. x4 On the other side, some pundits argued that 
the U.S. should respect the decision because the political eost of undercutting the 
WTO outweighs the benefit of ignoring its ruling. x5 It seems that a court might 
view the whole issue of responding to a WTO panel decision as a question of 
policy rather than law. Such a view was adopted by the court in Corus. X6 Some 
83 Elizabeth Becker. US Tilrij/.' Oil S!l!ei arl! !/legal, /II"'1i1 Tmlil! (),gOlli~o!ioll San. N.Y. TI~IFS, 
November II, 2003, at i\ I. 
84 Jd. 
85 Iii . .'leI! a/so Thomas Crampton, Jopal/ allil E. U. Thrm!uI u.s. (11/ Illlp"r! SOl/clioll,\', N. Y. TIMES, 
November II, 2003 at i\ I. 
Sh eorus Eng'g Steels Ltd. v. United States, No. 03-110, ,lip op. at 7 «('t. Inl'l Trade Aug. 27, 20(3). 
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courts have accepted u blanket stutement of such policy-based deference in 
antidumping Iaw.~7 
Judicial abdication based on such a sweeping policy-based characteri-
zation of tariff and antidumping law is flawed. Many court decisions touch on 
questions that policy makers are vitally interested in. Additionally, a political 
branch has spoken on this subject; the policy of the U.S. has been announced by 
the joining of an international organization dedicated to the harmonization of 
trade practices. Prior to the Uruguay round, a court noted that "when Congress 
enacted the Trade and Tariff Act, it reaffirmed its intention to maintain the consis-
tency of United States laws." In addition, the establishment of an independent 
governmental agency, the Trade Administration, to implement the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement further evidences U.S. commitment to a non-policy-based 
enforcement of the Agreement. As the Federal Mogul Court admitted, 
the independent status of the International Trade Commission was 
intended to insulate the Government's decision to impose antidumping 
duties from narrowly political concerns. XX 
There simply is not enough room for the executive to promulgate a policy that 
would undermine the stability of an international regime that Congress has 
endorsed. Consequently, the Commerce Department's interpretation of pennis-
sible antidumping regulation contrary to U.S. treaty obligations, as evidenced by 
R7 Fl'Il. ,HoglIl. ()3 F3d at 15S2. ("Commerce is due judicial deference in part because of its 
established expertise in administration of the Act, and in part beeausc of 'the foreign policy repercussions of a 
dumping dctermination. '''): Smith-Corona Group \" United Statcs, 713 F.2d 15hS. 1571 (I st Cir. 19R3) ("'[TIlle 
foreign policy repercussions of a dumping deterl11ination. . makes the enforcement of the antidumping law a 
ditTieult and supremely delicate endeavor."). 
XX h3 F.3d at 15S I. 
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an intemational tribunal's decisions, should not be endorsed as a policy-based 
decision. 
3. Executive e.\pel'tise alld speciali::.ed knowledge (Ire better sllited to ./c)l'cign 
(!ltc/irs questiolls 
Administrative agenCIes are often pnvy to a significant amount of 
information regarding foreign affairs that are not available to the judiciary. 
Consequently, judges may be reluctant to question the political branch that seems 
to have all of the answers. X!) This executive expertise seems to fall into two 
groups. First, the employees and agents of the Trade Administration have signif-
ieantly more experience dealing with the intricacies of intemational trade than an 
average federal judge. A judge may be uncomfortable adventuring into such an 
"alien" area of law and facts. Second, much information is simply not available 
to the judge from an appropriate domestic source of information. In the pursuit 
of relevant information, a judge may find hcrself delving into sensitive 
diplomatic issues outside the traditional scope of judicial scrutiny. In the area of 
antidumping cases, a federal judge may decline to impose her judgment because 
the Trade Administration is the expert in this area and the judge lacks etTective or 
appropriate access to information that would rebut the administration's findings. 
X9 Jonathan Charney of Vanderbilt Univer,ity noted that: 
Ie Jourt forays into international law are onen episodic. Judges may consider themselves 
ill-equipped to decide any such quc,tions placed heforc thcm. For example. treaties are 
negotiated in international forums whose rccords may be unfamiliar. The sources of 
cu,tomary internationall'l\\ arc ,imilariy untLulliliar. Some dome,tic judge, would pretcr 
to rely upon the view, of the executive branch, which h,,, expertise ill these matters. 
Charney, slIl'ra note 55, at ~()9. 
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This argument is curious because it belies one of the key features of 
American jurisprudence: the parties are the agents of discovery, not the judge. 
Also, the executive presumably does not enjoy an absolute monopoly on 
knowledge of the application of international trade law. In Co rl/S , the defending 
party hired competent and knowledgeable counsel, experts in international 
antidumping law. Further, there are other organizations with significant interest 
in the application of antidumping law that might provide guidance and expertise. 
The WTO employs highly qualified staff and enjoys access to all of the 
information necessary to make the determinations. 
Regarding access to sensitive diplomatic information, this concern 
makes little sense when applied to antidumping law. The law has been codified 
by Congress in the context of an international agreement. Though the Executive 
certainly is privy to an administration's goals in implementing the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, Congress has endorsed the promotion of a consistent international 
regime. Therefore, it seems unlikely, though possible, that the Trade 
Administration would be privy to diplomatic information that would dispute the 
need for a transparent and internationally harmonious application of the 
agreement. As with the question of policy, any diplomatic information that would 
undermine the integrity of an international regime endorsed by Congress should 
be given little weight in the abstract. In other words, absent clear indication of 
specific information or sources of information that the Executive alone is privy 
to, a cOUli should be reluctant to refuse review based on the speculative 
possibility of such information. 
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B. Chevron Dej"erellce, the Channing Betsy Canon, and Their Conflict 
Under the Chevron doctrine, courts typically grant deference to the 
executive branch in detel111ining the application of some statutes. However, in the 
arena of foreign atTairs and treaties, another doctrine, the Charming Betsy 
interpretive canon, may trump the Chevron doctrine. The Charming Bet.\y canon 
holds that when a statute is ambiguous, a court ought to interpret so as not to 
violate international law. But the contlict ofWTO panel decisions with executive 
determinations takes place one step removed from the traditional conflict. The 
nature of WTO panel decisions adds a complication to the ordinary tension 
between the two doctrines. 
I. The Chevron doctrine 
In general, the Chevron doctrine permits a court to grant substantial 
deference in the interpretation of a statute. However, this doctrine may be 
trumped by the Charming Bels\" canon of interpretation. This conflict has special 
significance to interpretation of antidumping law because Congress has not 
specified the methodology (whether zeroing or another methodology), and the 
WTO has spoken on the impermissibility of zeroing under GATT. 
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In Chevron, the Supreme Court set out the "Chevron test": 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does 
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would 
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
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Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's 
answer is based on a pennissible construction of the statute. 90 
The Court set up a two prong test for judicial interpreting of legislation, 
including treaties and statutes: (1) Docs the statute or treaty specifically require 
a particular interpretation? I f it does, then the court must apply the statute as 
explicitly required; (2) If the statute or treaty is ambiguous, is the interpretation 
of the legislation by an administrative agency permissible? If so, then the court 
must "defer, even if it would have come to quite a different view ifleft to its own 
devices.",!1 One court noted: 
The court need not conclude that the agency's construction is the only 
reasonable one, or that it would have reached that result had the question 
aris-cn before it in the first instance.'Il 
In the case of CorllS, the court first determined that the implementing legislation 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement did not specify how antidumping duties should 
be levied.'I3 Then the court afforded great deference to the interpretation of the 
Trade Administration in using the zeroing mcthodology.94 
90 CIIl'\"""'. 467 U.S. al R42 ~43. Inlhe eonlext ofanlidlllllping law. the CIIl'\""(J/1 doelrine requires 
a courl to "sustain ('om mcree's determinations unless they arc 'unsupported by substantial evidence on the 
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law ... · Slater Steels Corp. v. United States. No. 03-162. slip 01'. at 
I (CI. Int'! Trade Dec. I h. 20(3) (qw,ting I') L.Se ~ I" I hai b)( I )( H)). "Under CII('\'r!J/I, it is only if the ('ourt 
concludes that 'Congress either had no intent on the matter. or that ('ongress's purpose and intent regarding the 
matter is ultimately unclear: that the Court will defer to Commerce's construction." !d (quoting Timex VI., 
Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d R79, ~RI (Fed. Cir.19(8)). 
91 ('ont'l Air Lines v. Dep't ofTransp., 843 F2d 1444, 1449 (D.c. Cir. 1988). 
92 Footwear Distrib. & Retailers of Am. v. linited States, 852 r. Supp. IOn, 1089 (CI. Inl'l Trade 
1994). Sl'(, IIlso Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,450 (197X): Udall \. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 
16 (1965). 
93 The COI'llS Court noted that "I b lecause the antidumping statutes arc silent regarding the treatment 
of negative margins. the practice of zeroing has becn challcnged a number of times in different contexts." Corus 
I'ng'g Steels l.ld. \. United Slates, No. 03-110. slip op. at 17 tel. Int'I Trade i\u~. 27. 20(3). 
94 Relying on preecllcnt, the court held that Commerec's intcrprelation of anlidumping legislation 
was reasonablc because it pre\'Cnted ""masked dumping." Id. Sl'(, (Ilso Serampore Indus. Pvl. Ltd. v. U.S. Dep't 
of Commerce, 675 F.Supp. 1354, 1360-61 (el. Inri Trade 19X7): Bowc Passat Reinigungs-Und 
Wascherciteehnik GMBH v. Uniled States, 92(' F.Supp. II3X. 1150 (et. Inl'l Trade 1996): Timken Co. v. 
United States, 240 F. Supp. 2d 122X, 1243 44 (CI. Inri Tradc 20(2). 
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At least one scholar has advocated a Chcvroll deference approach to 
judicial review of executive application of international law,'!5 including treaties 
and their executing legislation.96 Curtis Bradley suggested a Chcvron approach to 
judicial defcrcnce to the executive in the international arena. This approach is 
certainly attractive. It would add consistency and coherence to the analysis of this 
question because it would adopt a well established doctrine in an area of 
uncertain precedent. For the purposes of this section, this author will assume that 
a federal district court'!7 would apply a ChcI'I'OIl-like approach to the question 
before us, namely, should a decision by the Department of Commerce be scruti-
nized using a WTO panel decision? 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement was incorporated into U.S. law. YX The 
statute docs not specify which methodology must be used to calculate 
antidumping duties.99 The question then becomes whether Commerce permis-
95 Bradley, slIpra note 55 at 651 652. Curtis Bradley proposed that courts should apply a general 
CIWI'roll deference to executive branch decisions in I(lreign alfairs. He argued that l11uch could be gained 
by considering foreign aihlirs law Irom the perspective of the Che\T(ln doctrine in 
administrative law. Under this doctrine, courts will defer to an agency's interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute if the agency has been charged with administning the statutc and 
the agency's interpretation is based on a "permissible" reading of the statute. 
!d. 
96 Sumitol11o Shoji AI11 .. Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, I X4 X5 (I n2); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 
U.S. I X7, 194 (1961). See also Rlcs 1 ;lT~lU' 1 (Tll]](ll) Ol FORll(;'1 RHAll()CJS ~326(2) (19X7) ("Courts. . will 
give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch."); 1'1 AI lsI'. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng. 525 
U.S. 155, 167 (1999); Factor v. Laubenheimer. 290 U.S. 276. 295 (1933); Demjanjuk v'. Pctrovsky. 776 F.2d 
571, 579 (6th Cir. 19X5) (stating that the executive branch's "logical reading" of a treaty "is entitled to consid-
erable deference"). 
97 The Court of International Trade recently adopted this approach in re\'iewing Commerce's 
antidumping regulations. Slater Steels Corp. v. United States, No. 03-162. slip op. at I (Cl.lnt"! Trade Dec. 16, 
20(3). 
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9X 19 U.s.c. ~ 1671 (2005) ('I. se'l. 
99 19 U.s.c. ~ 1673(2) (1994), which states: 
If --
(2) the lTrade Administration I determines that 
(A) an industry in the United ,tate, 
(i) is materially injured, or 
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, 
by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of ,ales (or the likelihood of sales) of that 
Issue 1 The WTO and u.s. Antidumping Law 
sibly interpreted the statute. Congress has entrusted the application of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and its executing domestic law to Commerce and, 111 
particular, the Trade Administration. 
Evcn if a court concluded that Commerce's interpretation of the Anti-
Dumping Agrccment was questionable, a court still may grant discretion because 
of the Executive Branch's implied authority over foreign affairs legislation. 
Because Congress typically grants the Executive Branch power to implement 
international trade law, any administrative provision touching on it might be 
shielded by foreign affairs deference. The Supreme Court recognized this 
supplementary category of deference in u.s. v. Mead Corp.: 
Congress ... may not have expressly delegated authority or 
responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a 
particular gap. Yet it can still be apparcnt from the agency's 
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances 
that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with 
the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills 
a space in the enacted law, even one about which "Congress did 
not actually have an intent" as to a particular result. When 
cirClIlIlstances imp~\'ing slich all expectation exist, a reviewing 
court has IlO husilless rejecting all age/1(~V :s' exercise oj" its 
generally conj"erred authority to resolve a particular statutory 
ambiguity simply because the agency's chosen resolution seems 
unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency's position if Congress 
has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency's 
interpretation is reasonable. [1111 
Thus, the ChCl'l"OlI doctrine may otTer separate grounds, other than 
foreign affairs deference, for executive dominance in the realm of foreign affairs. 
mcrchandisc tll[ importation, thcn there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping 
duty. 
Id. Thc tcxt of the statute itsclf docs not specify how the Trade Administration should "dctcrmine" such injury. 
Courts hav·e notcd that the statutory language is silent as [0 the mcthodology to be adoptcd in assessing 
antidumping duties. See. e.g .. B{JlI'e PasSi/!. 92C> 1'. Supp. at 1150 (""Thc statute is silcnt on the question of 
zcroing negative margins."); Scram!,or", (,75 F. Supp. at 13nO ("A plain rcading of the statutc discloses no 
provision tllr Commcrcc to otlset salcs madc at LTFV with salcs madc at fair valuc."). 
100 533 U.S. 21X, 229 (2001) (citations omittcd & cmphasis addcd). 
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However, this doctrine loscs some of its strength when held up next to a 
sometimes competing doctrine: the preference for avoiding violation of intema-
tional law in judicial interpretation of congressional enactments. 
2. The Charming Betsy may trump Chevron 
COUl1s hesitate to apply the Chevron doctrine directly if the adminis-
trative agency's interpretation of the statute would violate U.S. obligations in 
international law. The Charming BeL), canon acts as a braking mechanism on the 
broad application of U.S. law in the international arena. Simply stated, the 
Charming Betsy canon statcs that "an act ofCongrcss ought ncvcr to bc construcd 
to violate thc law of nations if any other possible construction remains."lol The 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations states the rule thus: "Where fairly 
possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to connict with 
intcrnational law or with an international agrccmcnt of thc United Statcs."11I2 
The Charming BeLlY is not a substantive application of international law, 
though some would advocate such a use. IO .1 Rather, the Charming Betsy canon is 
an interpretative tool. Congress may choose to violate international law, whether 
ld 
101 Murray v. Schooncr Charming Bctsy, (, U.S. 64, II X ( I X(4). Thc Suprcmc Court abo stakd: 
lAin act ofCongrcss ought ncvcr to bc construcd to violalc thc law of nations ifany othcr 
possiblc construction rcmains, and, conscqucntly can ncvcr bc construcd to violatc 
ncutral rights, or to atfect neutral commerec, further than is warranted by the law of 
nations as undcrstood in this country. 
102 RISI\lcMLNT (TllIRD) ()I F()I{l'I(;~ RtLMI()NS ~ 114 (19X7). 
103 Curtis A. Bradley, The Channing Betsy CIIIIOII IIlId SCl'lIratioll o! 1'0\1'('1'.1'.' Rethillkillg tile 
III/!!Il)!'!!/i,·" Ro/e ollll/e/'l/II/iollll/ Lill', X6 GIO. L..I. 479, 4lJX (199X). Though hc di"'grccs "ith thc vic\\', 
Bradley note, that: 
Id. 
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Is lomc judgcs and commcntators ... I havc I argucd for what could bc called an "intcrna-
tionalist conception" of the canon. In esscncc, this conccption vicws thc canon as a 
mcans of supplcmcnting U.S. law and contlmning it to thc contours of intcrnalional law 
Undcr this vicw, courts should usc thc canon not primarily to implcmcnt legislativc 
intcnt, but rather to make it harder tllr Congress to violate intcrnational law, and to 
t'lcilitate U.S. implcmcntation of international law. 
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the international norm is established by treatylf14 or customary international 
law. lOS "The Charming Bet.,)" canon does not apply when the reach of a statute is 
clear."IO(, As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated, a judge's "duty is to 
enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform 
the law of the land to norms of customary international law."lo7 In other words, 
Congress may violate international law, but courts will presume that Congress 
did not intend such a violation absent clear legislative intent. 
It is useful to note the historical context of the Charming Betsy decision. 
Curtis Bradley noted that Charming Bets.\' was decided in an era very different 
fi'om the CUITent one. IOX He pointed out three principal distinctions between the 
world of Charming Bet,), and our own. First, the U.S. was a f1edgling state, eager 
to avoid war with the more powerful international actors. I09 The Court 
recognized that it was in the nation's best interest not to unnecessarily interpret 
statutes so as to antagonize more powerful European states. Second, at the 
104 SI!I! Brcard v. Greene. 523 U.S. 371.376 (199R); Ping v. Uniled States. 130 U.S. SRI. 600 
( I SX9); Whitney v. Robertson. 124 U.S. 190. 194 ( I XXX); Fdye v. Robertson. 112 U.S. 5XO, 597 ( I XS4). 
105 SI!C e.g., (jalo-Garcia \. Immigration & Naturalization Sen'., XC> F.3d 916, 91 X (9th Cir. 19(6); 
United States v. Yunis.lJ24 F.ld 10Xr" 1091 (D.C. Cir. 19(1); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 7XX F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th 
Cir.). cert. dellied, 575 U.S. 1022 ( 19R6); The Paquete Ilabana, 175 U.S. (177, 700 ( 19(0). 
106 Curtis A. Bradley, [lll/I'iT,wl Jurisdictiol/ alld u.s LillI', 20(JI U. CIIIC. U(iAL F. 323, 332 
(200 I). SI!I! also nil/is, 924 F.2d at 1091; (iarciil-Mir, 7XS F.2d at 1453; Comrn. of U.S. Citizens Living in Niear. 
v. Reag<lIl, X59 F.2d 929. 93X (D.C. Cir. 19RX) ("Statutes inconsistent with principles of customary international 
law may well lead to international law violations. But within the d01llestic legal realm, that inconsistent statute 
simply modities or supersedcs customary international law to the ex lent of the inconsistency."); Fed. Trade 
Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mollsson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1323 (D.C'. Cir.19W) (U.S. cOllrts arc 
"obligated to gi\'c ctle<:t to an unamhiguous exercise by ('ongress of its jurisdiction to prescribe eyen if ~uch an 
exercise \VOllld exceed the limitations imposed by international la\\',"). 
107 limis. 924 F2d at 1091. See "Iso Reed v. Wiser, 555 E2d 1079, 1093 (C'.A.N.Y. 1(77). 
lOX Bradley, Charllling Betsy ('(///(1/1. Sill}/'(! note 103, at 491 492 (Bradley examincd the "contelll-
porary validity of thc ('harming Bets\' canon" and poinled out that "it Illay be useful to consider first the 
historical contcxt of its adoption." He criticized the blind usc of the canon without "considering the context in 
which the 'canon' w,asJmade."). 
109 I". at 492 (The "Supreme Court was undoubtedly aware," when Chwmillg Bels.!' was decided, 
that ·'the U.S. government had a strong desire to avoid violations of inlcrnationallaw, largely due to a fear that 
a violation Illight embroil the United States in a military conflict."). 
265 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT R[:VIEW Spring 2005 
beginning of the nineteenth century, international law was commonly used as a 
kind of federal common law. 111I Therefore, the commonly accepted canon of 
preferring interpretations of statutes that do not contradict the common law 
supp011ed a similar preference when it came to international law. I II Finally, 
Bradley points out that, at the time of Justice Marshall, "international law ... was 
widely considered to be objective and discoverable ... due in part to international 
law's association with natural law."112 Because international law was seen as 
"founded on the great and immutable principles of equity and natural justice,"113 
it could be "deducible by natural rcason."114 
Times have changed. No longer a quaking, fledgling nation, the United 
States is the preeminent military superpower of the world. Federal common law 
was expressly rejected in Erie. IIS Finally, since Justice Holmes and the realist 
revolution, mainstream American jurisprudence has jettisoned natural law as a 
110 Id. at 493 ( .. ( 'ourls in the ninetccnth century treated I customary international law I ,., part of the 
'general common law. "'). s~c "Iso Arthur M. Wei,burd, Till' I:\('clllin' Bmllch aI/(/ 11I1~mOli()/liI/ LillI', 41 VA~IJ. 
L. RFY. 1205, 1211 1214 (IngJ; William A. Fletcher, Til<' (j('IJem/ COIIIIIIOII I,({\\' olld !:iccliol1 34 of Ihe 
Jlldiciorl' Act of 171\£): nil' Exwllp/c o(Maril1c IlISlImllcc, 97 HAR\,. L. RE\,. 1513, 1527 3X ( 19S4); Stewart Jay, 
Origills o(Fedi'm/ COIIIIIIOII Lol\'.· Purl Tm), 133 U. PA. l.. RI·\,. 1231, 1263 65 (19~5). These articles aid 
understanding of the relationship between customary international law and the evolution of federal common 
law. These articles were all referenced by Bradley in his article. Bradley, Channing Betsy COli 011 , slIpm note 
103, at 492 n.75. 
III Bradley, Charming Betsy ('UIJ(!II, slIpm note 103. at 492. 
112 Id. at 494. 
113 The Venus, 12 U.S. 253, 297 (1~14) (Marshall, concurring). 
114 Bradley, Charming Betsy ('OIlOIl, s{{l'ra note 103, at 510 (quoting Blackstone who declared that 
universal principles were "deducible by natural reason," and that they "result Irolll those principles of natural 
justice, in which all the learned of every nation agrec"J. Sec 4 \VIIII~\\1 BI.\ch:sIONI', COhHdl'<rARllcs 66 67 
( 179G). 
115 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 7X (llJ3X) states: 
Except in mallers governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress. the law 
to be applied in any case is the law of the ,tate. And whether the law of the state ,hall be 
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by it, highest court in a decisilln is not a maller 
of federal concern. There is 1I0/(,(/CI'<I/ gelleml COIIIIIIOII /({\t'. 
(emphasis added). 
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general doctrinal principle, 11(, Justice Holmes rejected the idea of a discoverable, 
objective body of natural law: 
It is vcry hard to resist the impression that there is one august 
corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court 
concerned, If there were such a transcendental body of law 
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and 
until changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be 
right in using their independent judgment as to what it was, But 
there is no such body of law, The fallacy and illusion that I think 
exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be 
found,117 
International law was thereby finnly distinguished and distaneed from domestic 
law in the United States, 
In I ight of these considerations, Bradley suggested a reassessment of the 
continuing relevance of the Charming Bet\~\' doctrine, He rejected characterizing 
the doctrine as either a fiction of implied legislative intent llX or a substantive 
application of international law, 119 He came to the conclusion that the Charming 
Bet,sy doctrine should be viewed as 
II () The Co uri in D'ic, concluded that the practice of the federal courts in developing their o\\'n 
general common law rested on a hillacy. This fallacy involved the assumption, in the words of .lust ice Holmes, 
that "therc is 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and 
until changed by statute. ", Bradley, Charming Betsy ('([I/IJ/I, .IIII'm note 103, at 514. 
117 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 
51X,533 (192X). 
II R Bradley, Charming Betsy ('111/01/, .IIII'm note 103, at 495, 51 X. Among Bradley's criticisms of 
implying an '"internationally law-abiding character" to ('ongrcss was the significant empirical evidence that 
contradicts stich an asslimption. Id Bradley argues thai "'an intent-based account of the ('harming B(!I.,y canon 
\"ould have to confront prublcnwtic empirical evidcnce suggesting that compliance with international law is 
onen not the political branches' paramount concern." Id. He points to some examples: The recent Helms-Burton 
Act, thc Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and "the htilure by Congress during the last several years to authorizc timcly 
paymcnt of United States dues to the United Nations." Id. 
119 Id. at 523. The "Internationalist Conception," as Bradley sees it, would dictate that a court 
'" construe I a statute broadly to mirror international law, even if such a construction is not necessary in order to 
avoid a \·iolation of international law." III. at 499. "The internationalist conception is closely identified with the 
view that customary international law is an independent source of law liJr U.S. courts." Id. Among his criticisms 
of this view, Bradley points out that evidence of willingness on the part of the political branches to violate 
international law "also undermines the internationalist conception of the canon." Id. at 523. He argues that 
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a means of both respeeting the formal constitutional roles of 
Congress and the President and preserving a proper balance and 
harmonious working relationship among the three branches of 
the federal government. 120 
While this eomment neither accepts nor rejects Bradley's conclusions, 
his explanation of the evolution of the Charming Bets), doctrine is important to 
its application to WTO deeisions. Specifically, such considerations regarding the 
Charming Bet!',)' canon play an important role in rejecting the two extremist 
approaches (the "rule of law" or the "judicial hands-oft" approaches) and 
accepting a moderate third approach to the current tension between the Charming 
Betsy and the Chevron doctrines when opinions by the domestic administrative 
agencies contlict with the decisions of a foreign WTO panel. 
More generally, Bradley's observations underscore the modern relevance 
of the doctrine as a judicial tool of non-involvement. In other words, courts may 
justifiably use the canon in order to keep out of fights between the executive and 
the legislative branches of government. By assuming that an ambiguous statute 
does not violate international law, coulis can "redueer] the number of occasions 
in which Congress unintentionally interferes with the diplomatic prerogatives of 
the President."121 The eanon is based on the more fundamental premise that an 
Iii. 
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Itlhe approach of the political branches to thc human rights treaties is, for beller or worse, 
a rejection of internationalism. Far fro1l1 appro\ ing the jwJiciai enhancement of domestic 
law with international norms. the political branches have insisted -- at \cast in the contcxt 
of international human rights law, which is thc principal foclls of the internationalist 
conception -- that domestic law bc prcscrvcd unless and until the political branchcs 
incorporate the international norm~. 
120!d. at 525. 
121 Iii. at 52(,. 
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"[ a ]ct of Congrcss ought not bc construed to violate the Constitution if any other 
possible construction remains available."122 The rationale is that the 
Court [should avoid an interpretation of a statute] so as to give rise to a 
serious question of separation of powers which in turn would have 
implicated sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive over 
relations with foreign nations.' e1 
The international implications of a case would lead the Court to describe it as 
involving "public questions particularly high in the scale of our national interest," 
and thereby subject to an interpretive canon disfavoring violation of international 
law. 124 
Of course, the separation of powers rationale for the Charming BeLl), 
canon is suspect when the second prong of the Chevron doctrine (allowing an 
agency any permissible interpretation of legislation) and the Charming Betsy 
canon come into conflict. 
When the presumption against statutory violation of international law 
and executive agency interpretation come 111 direct conflict, the unambiguous 
congressional intent will override any contrary international obligation. In the 
specific case of U.S. obligations under GATT, both Congress and federal courts 
have clearly placed congressional legislation above contrary GATT language. Ie) 
However, where the implementing legislation of GATT agreements, including 
122 N.L.R.H. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi .. 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (noting that it has "in a numbcr 
of cases ... heeded the esscncc of ... Marshall's admonition in /\ll1rrlll'" by dcclining to interpret an Act of 
Congress so as "to violate the Constitution if any othcr possible construction rcmains available"). 
123 Id. (citing McCulloch v. Socicdad Nacional de Marincros de Honduras, 372 U.s. 10, 83 (1963 I). 
124 1d. 
125 Fed. Mogul Corp. v. Unitcd Statcs. ('3 F3d 1572, 15RI (Fcd. Cir. 1995) ("[I[n the evcnt ofa 
conflict betwccn a (jATT obligation and a statutc. the statutc Illust prnail."); 19 U.S.c. * 3512(a)( I) ("No 
provision of any of thc Uruguay Round Agrcclllcnts, nor the application of any such provision to any pcrson or 
eirculllstance. that is inconsistent with any law of thc Unitcd States shall havc etlcct."). 
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the Anti-Dumping Agrcemcnt, is ambiguous, thc Charming Betsy doctrinc may 
apply. GATT and thc forming trcaty of thc WTO arc "intcrnational obligations, 
and abscnt cxprcss Congrcssionallanguagc to thc contrary, statutes should not be 
interpreted to conflict with international obligations."'2!> In this respect, the 
Charming Bet,\y canon is in harmony with thc first prong of thc Chevron tcst 
(inquiring as to whethcr a congressional act is ambiguous). 127 
Thc rulcs may comc in contlict during application ofthc sccond prong of 
thc Chel'ron tcst (dctcrmining whcthcr an agcncy intcrprctation is pcrmissible). 
Assuming that Congress has not cxplicitly spoken to the issuc, an administrative 
agency nornlally has discretion to implement the legislation in any reasonable 
way.12X However, if the agency acts contrary to international law, a court may feel 
inclined to intcrprct Congrcss's implicd intcnt to invalidatc the agency's 
action.124 
126 Fed. A4oglll. 63 F.3d at 15X I (citing the (harming Be/s!' doctrine in support of its determination 
that the Anti-Dumping Agrcement should be interpreted in accordance with "international economic 
understanding"), However, the F,,<I('/'ol ,i/oglll court stilluphcld Commerce's application of GATT contrary to 
sllch inLcrnalionaiullucrslunuing because "Commerce b due judicial deference in part because of its established 
expertise in administration of the Act, and in part bccau~c of 'the foreign policy rcpcrcu~~iol1~ of a dumping 
determination,'" Id. quoting Smith-Corona Group v, United States 713 F.2d 156X, 1571 (19X-I), Sl'e 01.10 
Footwear Distrib, & Rctailers of Am, v, United Stales, X52 F. Supp, IOn, 1092 (CLlnt'1 Trade 1994): Fundicao 
Tupy S.A, v, United States. 652 F. Supp, 153X, 1543 (Ct. Int'l Trade I<JX7) ("An interpretation and application 
of the statute which would contlict with thc GATT Code, would clearly \'iolate the intent of Congress,"), 
127 See discussion ,I'llI'm Part 111.13.1. 
12~ The rederal Circuit Court of Appeals quippcd that "there may be some question whelher 
Commerce's new methodology is entitled to Chel'roll dcference," Fed MoglIl, 63 F,3d at 15XO, The court noted 
"the uneven history of Commerce's approach to this problem." and "that Commerce's approaches have been 
t(lUnd unlawful in prior decisions," !d at 1579, Nevertheless, the court applied a (h(,I'mll standard ofdeferenec 
to the agency's interpretation of antidumping law because Commerce had a long-standing policy that \Vas not 
unreasonably interpreted trom the statute, 1<1, at 15~0, As noted abO\e, this conmlent assllmes that a court would 
utilize a Ch"''/'(!Il-likc deference to the interpretation of antidumping law by Commerce and the Trade 
Administration, One reason for this assumption of deference is that a court will grant deference simply because 
the agcncies arc acting within tiJreign allairs, United States v, Mead Corp" 533 U,S, 21~, 229 (200 I), 
129 However. in at least one case, the Supreme Court ignored the C//(//'ming Be[s)' doctrinc 
altogether and summarily refused to imply a prohibition on inlernationul abductions in the United States-
Mexico Extradition Treaty based on O\erwhelming international law, U,S, v, Alvarez-Machain, 504 U,S, 655, 
669 670 (1992), The Court acknowledged that the action ofLJ,S, DFA agcnts was "shocking," and that "it may 
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Courts are reluctant to invalidatc executive action in foreign affairs based 
on the Charming Bct.\)' doctrinc without a clear intell1ational norm. un Courts 
express this reluctance "because of practical necessity and exccutive 'branch 
expertise, Congress may need to delegate especially broad foreign affairs powers 
to the Exccutive."I.11 This need to delegate is required because 
congressional legislation which is to be madc effective through 
negotiation and inquiry within the intcrnational ficld must often 
accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from 
statutory restriction which would not be admissible wcre 
domestic affairs alone involved. I.12 
Recognizing this judicial reluctance to apply international law to 
invalidatc executive action, what are the sourccs of intcll1ational law that might 
invoke thc Charming Bet.)' doctrinc? The Intemational Court of Justice ("IC],,), 
possibly the most well-recognized intcll1ational tribunal, recognizes four 
particular sources of intcmational law: (I) "intell1ational conventions"; (2) 
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law"; (3) 
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"; (4) certain "judicial 
decisions and thc teachings of thc most highly qualified publicists of the various 
[have] belenl in violation of general international law principles."' Id. at 6(,9. However, the Court concluded that 
the prohibition was not expressly written into the treaty and that Iherefixe "the decision of whether respondent 
should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside ofthe Treaty, is a matter for the Executive 8ranch." Iii. In any 
case, A/I'lIre:-!v/achaill breaks with the traditional canon and has not been widely accepted in the U.S. or in the 
international community. S"e I" II'RNAJ JONAI. LAW 211-225 (Carter et aL cds" 4th cd, 2(03), 
130 Hyundai Elcc, Co, v, United States, 53 F Supp, 2d 1334, 1345 (eL Inri Trade 1999) ("So 
viewed, unless the conflict between an international obligation and Commerce's interpretation of a statute is 
abundantly clear, a court slH!llld take special eare bct(lre it upsets COlllllleree's regulatory authority under the 
(harmillg BI!I.IT doctrine,"), 
131 Bradley, Chn'/'(m DI!/i'rellce, .I'llI'm note 55, at 6RR (citing the Cllrtiss-11,'ight decision and its 
progeny in support of this judicial presumption), 
13~ United States v, Curtiss-Wright Exp, Corp" 299 U,S, 304, 320 ( 1936), 
271 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."133 The le1 
statement of international law appears to confute any res judicata etlect of the 
decisions of intemational tribunals. First, "judicial decisions" are only cited as 
"subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. "1,-1 Second, the forming 
treaty of the IC] specifically prohibits a res judicata etTect of the ICJ's 
decisions. 135 There is no establishment of precedent by the decision of an 
international court. 
Similarly, the Restatement identifies three principal sources of interna-
tionallaw: 
(I) [c ]ustomary international law result[ingl from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation; (2) [international agreements that either] create 
law for the states parties thereto [or] lead to the creation of 
customary international law when such agreements are intended 
for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted; 
and (3) [g]eneral principles common to the major legal systems, 
even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or interna-
tional agreement ... as supplementary rules of international law 
where appropriate. '36 
The decisions of intemational tribunals are noticeably absent from this list of 
sources of international law. Whi Ie such tribunals may be evidence of an interna-
tional norm or interpretation, they are not widely recognized by U.S. courts as a 
general source of law. 
133 Statute of the International COLIrt of Justice, October 24,1945, arl. .lX, 59 Stal. 1031, T.S. No. 
993. 
134 !d 
135 Id. ("The decision of Ihe Court has no binding t()rce except between the parties and in respect 
of that particular casc."). 
136 RLS L\II,~lI·.N r (TIIIIUl) ()I hlRrl(iN RU.AII()NS L.\\\' ~ 102 (19X7). 
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There is an important distinction between customary international law 
and positive treaty law: a federal court would likely require clear positive 
declaration of the norm by an authoritative U.S. domestic source to invalidate an 
executive foreign affairs action.137 In Garcia-Mil', the Eleventh Circuit declared 
that public international law is controlling only "where there is no treaty and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision."13x The court wcnt on 
to hold that, though "courts must construe American Law so as to avoid violating 
principles of public international law," the executive branch may legally violate 
customary international law by affirmative declaration or conducLl3'! However, 
this distinction docs not apply directly to this comment because WTO panel 
decisions arc not reflections of customary international law.I~1I Rather, panel 
decisions are evidence of international understanding of the Commerce 
Department's obligations under treaty.I~1 
137 Garcia-Mir v. Meese, nx F.2d I 44(), 1453 (11th CiLl. ccrl. dellinl, 575 U.S. 1022 (19R6). In 
Carcia-Jfir, the court upheld the inddinite and arhitrary detention of immigrants in the U.S. by the Attorney 
General. even though such detention was contrary to international law. III. The court held that a public interna-
tionalnorm could be rendered ineffective within the U.S. if contradicted either by a legislative act, executive 
act, or ajudicial decision. Id. at 1453 1455. 
13R Id. quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900): see Lauritzen Y·. Larsen, 345 U.S. 
571. 57X (195X) 
139 Garcia-.lfir, nx F.2d at 1453. 
140 A. iv'lark Weisburd . . lfll('ricall.flltiges allti IlIlemaliollull.II\.:36V.Y.\Il . .I.TR.YNS.J.\[.1. L. 1475, 
152R (2003) ("l) .S. courts should react cautiously to suggestions that tilcy rely on the opinions of international 
tribunals as sources of rules of Icustol11ary international law I."). In particular. \Veishurd was concerned that 
International Trihunals do not usually rellect the current state of customary international law ("CIL") because 
while ClL is built as a quasi-common law body of jurisprudence (developed over time by jurists), international 
tribunals generally carry no precedent-creating powers and arc dilTieultto correct. Id. 
141 Though this author asserts that Panel decisions may be "evidence of' international 
understandings, this docs not imply that they arc necessarily reliable evidence of international understanding. 
There arc many problems with the deci,ion-making processes of international tribunals that may rcnder thcir 
judgments suspect. See e.g. .lenny S. Martinez, Trlll'ilrds allllll('l'I/ali(}fwl.llldicial S\'slem, 56 SlAt--:. L. RF\·. 429, 
461 (2003) (noting the dilliculties of having counter-majoritarian intcrnational tribunals with no international 
"supreme court" to provide continuity); John M. Czarnctzky & Ronald .I. Kychlak, All /:'mpire Of LiIll':J: 
Legalism al/(I tile IIII('/'I/{{Iiollal Crimilllli COllrl, 79 NOIRlc DA~IF L. RIY'. 55, 59 (2003) (arguing that the 
International Criminal Court contains a "fundamcntaillaw" because it lacks "any moral and political check as 
part of[ its 1 structurc"). 
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The interpretation of international obligations by an international 
tribunal docs not have mandatory binding effects within the United States. As the 
Supreme COUli noted, 
while we should give respectful consideration to the interpre-
tation of an international treaty rendered by an international 
court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has been recognized in 
international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the 
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the 
implementation of the treaty in that State. 142 
Courts nonetheless grant some weight to WTO panel decisions as evidence of 
international understandings of treaty obligations. 
Roger Alford identified a spectrum of deference granted to the 
application of international tribunal decisions. 143 Alford analyzed, among other 
issues, the judiciary's treatment ofWTO panel decisions. He placed the deference 
granted to WTO decisions in the middle of his continuum, where fq.lcral courts 
consider the pancl decision "as part of the process of interpreting and construing 
a domestic statute, without considering the possibility of directly recogniz[ing] 
and enforc[ing] the [panel] decision."144 
Despite the lip service paid to panel decisions as evidence of interna-
tional agreement, such decisions arc apparently given little weight in practice. In 
Timken, the court summarily discussed and then dismissed the WTO panel 
decision at issuc in the Coms ease. 14 :i Thc court first noted that because the 
14~ Breard v. Greene, 523lJ.S. 371, 375 (199X). 
143 AIt'wd, supra note 53. at 731. 
144 1d. 
145 Tilllkell Co. v. United States, 240 F. Slipp. 2d Ing. 1243 (Ct. Inrt Trade 2(02) (disclI"ing the 
EC Bcd Lil/el/ decision by the WTO Appellate Body). 
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United States was not party to the EC Bed Linen ease, there was no direet effeet 
of the decision on the Icgality of U.S. zeroing practices. 146 Secondly, the court 
declined to compare European and U.S. zeroing practices and found it dispositive 
that the WTO decision only addressed the former. The court distinguished the 
WTO decision from the issue before it because 
the EC-Bed Linen decision involved a comparison, made during 
an antidumping investigation, of weighted averages for export 
prices and normal value, while the instant case involves a 
comparison, made during an administrative review, of weighted-
average normal values to transaetion- specific export prices. '47 
However, this distinction may be criticizcd because both decisions, that of thc 
WTO pancl and thc Timkcn Court, were premised on review of essentially the 
same methodology: zeroing. The WTO in EC Bed Linen decided generally that 
zeroing was illegal and contrary to obligations under the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. I-1X Timkcn is an example of a U.S. domestic court straining interpre-
tation of a panel report in order to avoid direct contlict between the WTO and an 
administrative agency. 
IV. WIIAT U.S. COURTS SIIOULD Do IN TilE FUTURE 
Now that the eonnict between WTO panel decisions and U.S. executive 
action in antidumping cases has been explored, we can look at the possible 
solutions to this contlict. Therc are thrcc general approaches to the problem. The 
14(, Iii. 
147 !tI. 
14X IT Bl'li UI/I!I/. \VT, DS I'll iAB.R (Mar. 1.2(01). 1/\·"i!"h!1! at 2001 WTO LFXIS 13. 
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first has been termed the "Marbury" approach, where courts take significant steps 
into the arena of international law and apply international jurisprudence directly 
in U.S. courts. On the opposite end of the spectrum, courts may take a hands-off 
approach; deferring to the executive on all matters of interpretation of interna-
tional agreements and obligations under international law. 
Between the two extremes, this author proposes a third approaeh that 
would require the Commerce Department to defend any practices in enforcing 
antidumping duties that run afoul ofWTO panel decisions. In other words, WTO 
panel decisions would create a presumption as to the U.S.'s obligations under 
GATT. Commerce could rebut the presumption by showing a pressing need for 
judicial deference to Commerce's determination. This third approach blends the 
presumptions of the Chel'l"On doctrine, the traditional deference to the executive's 
role in international affairs, the Charming BeLl), canon, congressional intent that 
the U.S. trade on equal and fair terms with the rest of the world, and respect for 
international organizations, like the WTO, that promote trade among nations. 
A. Why a "Marbltly" Approach vVould Not Work 
There is an approach, sometimes referred to as the "Marbury approach," 
that seems inadequate for this question. As Marshall so famously wrote, it is "the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.''149 Some 
authors have advocated a strict "rule of law" approach to foreign affairs jurispru-
149 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137. 177 (I X(3). 
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dence and an abandonment of the traditional deference given to the executive in 
foreign affairs. 150 
While this view certainly appears attractive for its simplicity and 
apparent championing of neutral legal structures, it fails to take account of the 
realities of intemational relations, and in particular, intemational antidumping 
law. The most obvious objection to direct judicial application of WTO panel 
decisions on domestic actions of a political branch of govemmcnt is the lack of 
statutory or constitutional authority to do so. The federal judiciary only has 
power to decide cascs or controversies granted it by Congress or thc Constitution. 
151 As noted previously, Congress has explicitly forbidden direct application of 
WTO appellate decisions on domestic law. I):' Additionally, the Charming Betsy 
canon would not justi fy such a direct implementation of intemational law. The 
canon has never been a substantive source of law, but rather at most a tool of 
construction. 
B. Why a ./udicial "!fonds-of/Approach" U'ollld Not Be Advisahle 
As pointed out above, there are many reasons why interpretation of trade 
law should not be in the exclusive domain of the executive. 15] However, that only 
answers half of the question, i.e., whether the Judiciary should stay out of an 
150 See. e.g., Charney, slIl'm note 55, at X I J. See ,,/so Bradley, Ch('1'f"(J/1 /Jeii'rel/ce, slIl'm note 55, 
at 650 n.2 (retCrencing those who slipport the "'Marbury approach"'). 
151 U.S.C()Nsl.arl.lll.~2,cl.l. 
152 See ;\it()rd. slIl'm note 53. 
15J See disclission slIl'm Part III.B.2. 
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international trade law dispute between the executive branch and an international 
tribunal. One must further inquire, "Why should the judiciary step in?" 
As noted previously, the Charming Bet,\)' canon has come under criticism 
and its continuing relevance questioned. During the height of the realist era, 
interpretative canons in general were heavily criticized as contradictory, 
inaccurate fictions of congressional intent, and tools of judicial activism. 154 
Despite these criticisms, the Charming Betsy canon has continuing significance 
if it either truly reflects a discernable legislative intent or a legitimate judicial 
policy decision. Congress, by implementing the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
directly in U.S. law with little modification, expressed its intent to harmonize 
U.S. law with international standards. 15s FUl1her,judges may permissibly adopt a 
policy of international cooperation rather than unilateral antagonism, even if the 
U.S. is no longer the quaking youngster of a nation it once was. Such a policy 
judgment fits well within the traditional role of a judge to "bring discretion and 
judgment to statutory interpretation."15!> 
C. Recommended Approach: Use wro Panel Decisions As Evidence 
In Determining the Reasonableness oj"an Agency :\' Interpretation 
of u.s. Obligations Under International Law 
This author advocates that courts grant some weight to relevant panel 
"precedent"157 when reviewing the appropriateness of Commerce's interpretation 
154 Bradley, Charmillg B(!/s\', supra note 103, at 50S SOc,. 
155 S(!(! gel/eralh', Final Act Embodying the Rc"dts of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations Gcneral Agrecmcnt on Taritls and Trade, April IS, 1994. Annex lA, 1994 WL 7614X3. 
156 Bradley, Charmillg B!!/sl', supra note 103, at 509. S('!! also Jonathan R. Macey & Gcothey P. 
Millcr, Till! Callo/ls oj S/a/u/OIT CO/ls/ruc/ioll alld Judicial I'r<!jl!l'<!I1(,(,s, 45 VA~D. L. RleY. M7 (1992) 
(defending thc usc of canons of statutory construction generally). 
157 WTO PANEL decisions arc not "precedent" in that the dccision of the Body in onc casc has no 
binding authority to (a) other partics or (h) the same parties in a ditferent dispute. However. such decisions are 
illustrative of what the Body would do in a similar situation. 
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of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. When an executive policy regarding 
antidumping clearly conflicts with a competent international tribunal's decision, 
the administrative policy should be presumed unreasonable in the absence of 
explicit congressional approval. Such a presumption would in effect give WTO 
panel decisions a meaningful place in a traditional Chel'IWl analysis of the 
executive's action. 
This presumption of unreasonableness would be overcome by one of the 
rationales for judicial deference to the executive. Specifically, the executive can 
attempt to show that use of the WTO panel decision would violate an applicable 
policy underpinning traditional foreign affairs deference. For example, an agency 
could defeat the presumption by showing that such application of WIO panel 
decisions would either (I) impcrmissibly interfere with U.S. ability to present a 
united front, or a "sole voice," to the world community; (2) require a court to 
make a substantive foreign policy decision unsupported by either implied 
congressional intent or sound judicial policy; or (3) require a federal judge to 
make a judgment regarding a matter that is within the specialized or privileged 
knowledge of the agency.15X 
WIO panel decisions are, at the very least, evidenee of international 
understanding of U.S. obligations under international law. ls '> As such, they 
ISH Of course. the Exeeutive"s range of explanations would not be limited to these three possibil-
ities. These explanations arc presented because they are explained in this comment. Set' discussion slIJlm Part 
IlIA 
159 Sec slIJlm note 140. WTO panel decisions arc certainly not free of questionable intluences or 
outcomes. Nonetheless. federal court rhetoric. if not decisions. typically respects the opinions of international 
tribunals. Breanl v. Greene. 523 U.S. 371. 375 (199X). 
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invoke a weakened version of the Charming BeL~y doctrine by indicating to a 
U.S. domestic court that a competent international tribunal has spoken on the 
particular issue of U.S. obligations under an international Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. Given the context of the GATT talks and the purpose of the WTO, it 
seems reasonable to assume that Congress intended the U.S. to participate in 
good faith in a harmonized international trade regime, and due attention to the 
decisions of WTO Panels aids that harmonization. 
Applying this approach to COI"llS, the court would have rccognized that 
COl1um:rcc may have a legitimate reason to usc a zeroing methodology while 
calculating antidumping duties. Namely, such calculus may be necessary to 
combat "masked dumping," a purpose that the Court of International Trade has 
recognized as legitimate. 1611 Such a purpose may demonstrate a need for the Trade 
Administration to exercise its unique institutional competence and specialized 
knowledge to address the problem. The court, however, would not have ended the 
inquiry there. 
The court would have then addressed the contrary WTO panel decision 
and required the Trade Administration to demonstrate a pressing need (i.e. one of 
the three political deference doctrines mentioned above) for judicial deference of 
the administrative agency's action in this case. Mere assertion of potential 
160 Howe Passat Reinigungs-Und Waschereitechnik GMBH v. United States. 926 FSupp. 1138, 
1150 (el. Int'I Trade 1996) ("Commerccjustifics usc of this mcthodology on thc ground that it is nece"ary to 
combat masked dumping."); Serampore Indus. Pvl. Ltd. v. U.S. Dcp't ofComlllercc, 675 F.Supp. 1354,1361 
(et. Int'I Trade 1987) ("'Coml11eree has interpreted the statute in such a way as to prevent a I()reign producer 
Irolll masking its dUl11ping with morc profitable sales. COllll11erCe's interpretation is reasonable and is in 
accordancc with law."). 
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masked dumping would not be enough. Rather, the Administration would have to 
overcome the presumption against application of antidumping law contrary to 
WTO panel decisions by showing onc of thc "political questions" mentioned 
above.I!>1 
Such an approach would recognize that the ultimate authority on U.S. 
obligations under international law rests with the domestic political branches; 
Commerce could still act contrary to international opinion if it could show a 
pressing need. Nevertheless, requiring an administrative agency to demonstrate 
why its interpretation of antidumping law is proper, despite being contrary to 
international opinion, would encourage implementation of a transparent and fair 
international antidumping regime. Such a fair and transparent playing field 
clearly represents the policy of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
In addition, requiring explicit reasoning by Commerce would tend to 
preserve the separation of powers between the political branches and the 
judiciary. A rebuttal by Commerce would grant private parties more notiee as to 
when and why the U.S. is going to ignore the rules by which the rest of the world 
works. Such an explicit explanation may have saved parties like those in Cants 
from resorting to litigation. 162 Rather, with Commerce's intent clear and 
161 S~~ .I'llI'm note ISH. 
I (,2 It is unlikely that Corus itself would have been dissuaded hom tiling suit by the approach 
recommended here. ;\s noted already. COrtiS appears to be a test case in order It)r the I'uropean Community to 
request a WTO Panel on the subject of ;-eroing. See VIlP/"(/ note 49. However. parties that are not part of such a 
setup would likely benetit from the additional clarity required of the Commerce Department if WTO decisions 
were given greater weighl by courts. 
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unassailable in coul1, Corus would have been more likely to petition the political 
branches directly. In the end, courts could avoid deciding sensitive trade issues 
by requiring Commerce to more explicitly explain the need for foreign affairs 
deference in the face of contrary WTO panel decisions. 
Dan Nichols 
282 
